[Footnote 196a-1: The same principle is effective in intermediate commerce, and in the intervention of bankers between government and state creditors.] [Footnote 196a-2: This is much less the case in rents, for the reason that contracts here are made for a much longer term. Hence, here the farmer has as much to fear as to hope from a change of circumstances. Hence, too, we meet with a farmer who has grown rich much more seldom than with a manufacturer or a merchant.] [Footnote 196a-3: If an undertaker can cede his higher reward to another and guaranty its continuance, the circumstances which enable him to do this assume the nature of fixed capital; for instance, the trade or _clientèle_ secured by custom or privilege. If the undertaker has not the power to dispose of it in this way, the increased profit either disappears with his retirement from the business or falls to the owner of the capital employed, and still more to the land owner. Thus, for instance, how frequently it has happened that a store, which has been largely resorted to by the public, drawn thither by the business tact of the lessee, has afterwards been rented by the owner at a higher rent! (_Hermann_, loc. cit. 210.)] [Footnote 196a-4: _Lassalle's_ socialistic attacks on Political Economy have been directed mainly against the undertaker's profit or reward. Compare the work "Bastiat-Schulze von Delitzsch, der ökonom. Julian oder Kapital und Arbeit," 1863. By means of state credit, he would have this branch of income turned over to common labor. _Dühring_ also, Kapital und Arbeit 90, declaims not so much against capital as against "the absolutism of undertakers." _Schäffle_ D. Vierteljahrsschrift Nr. 106, II, 223, objects to this, that undertakers give value in exchange to unfinished products, a great service rendered even to the laboring class, who otherwise would have to resign the advantages of the division of labor.