Quetta road, 2 Batteries of Artillery, and about 300 Cavalry. We expect two more Infantry regiments up in about a fortnight, but till then we are certainly much below our proper strength. [Sidenote: Force ordered from Kandahar to the Helmund.] JUNE 30th.--The very worst dust-storm I have yet been in occurred to-day, as it blew from 12 o'clock till 3 a.m. on the 1st July, when the wind changed, and a most perceptible difference in the temperature occurred. Nothing could be more disagreeable than these 15 hours were, but the change in the heat quite repaid us for the previous discomforts. Orders were received from Simla to send the proposed force to Girishk at once, so the Cavalry Brigade will march on the 4th, and the remainder of the force on the 5th, a junction being effected on arrival, near Girishk. Girishk is about 90 miles from Kandahar, and the road is, for the most part, through dry uncultivated country, and there would not have been sufficient water at all the halting places for the combined Cavalry and Infantry Brigades. Girishk is on the River Helmund, and General Burrows has positive orders not to cross that River, and I can hardly suppose it possible that Ayoub Khan will venture to force the passage of the River against our vastly superior (in arms and discipline) force. In numbers, of course, he has, it is said, about ten times a larger force than we have, but that is not of much consequence. Putting aside as unlikely his making an attempt to cross the Helmund at Girishk, three courses are open to him. The first, and it is thought by the Political people the most probable, is, that on arriving near Girishk he will endeavour to come to terms with us, and put in his claim for the Amir-ship, and say he does not want to fight. The next is, that instead of making for Girishk, he might cross the Helmund, at, or near, a place you will see on the map called _Kala Bust_, and giving General Burrows the slip, come down the Argandab to Kandahar. This, though the most unlikely, is what I should like. The third course is to pass along to the north of Girishk and cross the Helmund near _Garm-ab_ (hot water), and bearing away northwards, pass along the Valley of the Tirin River, and eventually strike the Ghuzni road beyond Kelat-i-Ghilzi, and so get to Kabul without coming into collision with us at all. If Ayoub Khan does not want either to fight or make terms, or does not fall back on Herat, on finding us in force at Girishk, this last course seems a very likely one for him to take. These being the various alternatives, we ought, according to my idea, to have a small force in the Argandab Valley, near the junction of that River with the Helmund, and we should have a strong Brigade in the Tirin Valley, but both these moves are impossible, as we have no men, and it will take all we have to hold our own here. Of course, all is, at present, conjecture, and it might even be, so defective is