[137:1] I cannot avoid citing a parallel from contemporary history, which is by no means so far-fetched as may appear to those who have not studied both cases so carefully as I have been obliged to do. The Irish landlords, a rich, respectable, idle, uncohesive body, have been attacked by an able and organized agitation, unscrupulous, mendacious, unwearied, which has carried point after point against them, and now threatens to force them to capitulate, or evacuate their estates in the country. It has been said a thousand times: Why do not these landlords unite and fight their enemy? They have far superior capital; they have had from the outset public influence far greater; they have a far stronger case, not only in law, but in real justice: and yet they allow their opponents to push them from position to position, till little remains to be conquered. Even after a series of defeats we tell them still that if they would now combine, subscribe, select, and trust their leaders, they could win. And all this is certain. But it is not likely that they will ever do it. One is fond of his pleasures, another of his idleness, a third is jealous of any leader who is put forward, a fourth is trying underhand to make private terms with the enemy. A small and gallant minority subscribe, labour, debate. They are still a considerable force, respected and feared by their foes. But the main body is inert, jealous, helpless; and unless their very character be changed, these qualities must inevitably lead to their ruin. [138:1] Holm, in his remarkable estimate of the Greek policy of this time, goes so far as to say that Demosthenes' efforts even before Chæronea were mischievous, and that the idea he constantly puts forward, of making Athens great by weakening her old rivals Sparta and Thebes, is no better than supporting that old particularism which always made the Greeks inferior to any powerful or wealthy foreign State. Holm thinks that a larger and truer policy was that of Isocrates, who would have loyally accepted the hegemony of Philip, that he might lead the whole nation against a foreign enemy. We may be able to see things in that light now, yet I cannot blame Demosthenes, and the patriotic party at Athens, for neglecting the essay of Isocrates, and desiring to maintain Athens upon the old lines. But their effort was neither honestly nor persistently supported by the main body of the Athenians. [139:1] _Greek Life and Thought_, p. 4. [140:1] Above, § 10. [147:1] It is nevertheless not likely that Hypereides was personally intimate with Demosthenes, for he was not, as is usually stated, his contemporary, but a man of a younger generation, as I have argued in my _Greek Lit._ ii. 2, p. 371. I invite the critics either to refute or to accept the arguments there stated.