could be carried to any extent; strikes could be absolutely forbidden, and all dissatisfaction settled by the arbitration of the impartial government commission. Monopoly might even be legally maintained by a refusal of charters to would-be competitors, thus insuring to the public the advantages of a completely organized business without leaving the public at its mercy. The natural monopolies, such as railways, telephones, lighting-service, from which private fortunes have often been made at public expense, can easily be regulated by carefully considered and short-term franchises. Up to date, the partial and tentative trials of this plan have been encouragingly successful. But there are obvious defects in it, which we must notice: (1) The danger of failures in business would still exist. Some factors would tend to lessen this danger as, the prevention of stock- watering, misappropriation of funds, excessive salaries, and the unfair competition of rivals. But failures could no longer be averted by squeezing wages, neglecting conditions of production, or lowering the quality of goods. The employers may well ask, in bitterness, what right the Government has to close their chances of high profits when it leaves the chance of total loss. Private ownership of business, still retained on the plan we are considering, must involve risk of bankruptcy, with its economic waste and its suffering. (2) The plant, capital, and management of a business would still be entirely at the disposal of the owner, and handed down in his family or to partners voluntarily taken in. The son of a capitalist, who inherits the business, may be by no means the most deserving or efficient person to carry it on. Industry is not democratic under this plan; justice is attained as a compromise between the interests of capitalists and laborers. Class antagonisms are still fostered; distrust of the impartiality of the government commission would continually be present, and might at any time lead to actual rebellion and violence. (3) The temptations to corruption would be enormous. The capitalists, with their reserve funds, would be in a position to bribe or unfairly influence any susceptible members of the commissions; and with the danger of bankruptcy on the one hand, and the great prizes to be won on the other, there would inevitably result in the present state of the average human conscience-a great deal of foul play. Commissioners would have an unlimited opportunity of blackmailing employers. Labor members would pull in one direction, and upper-class members in another. The strain upon public morality would be severe.