Problems of Conduct: An Introductory Survey of EthicsDrake, Durant
Philosophy
Problems of Conduct: An Introductory Survey of Ethics
Drake, Durant
Ethics
H. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chap. III. S. E. Mezes, Ethics, chap IX.
Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chaps. II, IX. F. Thilly,
Introduction to Ethics, chaps. IV, V. F. Paulsen, book II, chap. I.
J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism. B. P. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, chap.
II. The classic accounts of a rational foundation of ethics are to
be found by the discerning reader in Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, and
Republic (esp. books. I, II, IV), and Aristotle's Ethics (esp. books. I
and II). For refinements in the definition of right and wrong, see
G. E. Moore, Ethics, chaps. I-V; B. Russell, Philosophical Essays,
I, secs. II, III. International Journal of Ethics, vol. 24, p. 293.
Definitions of value without reference to pleasure or pain will be
found in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,
vol. II, pp. 29, 113, 141. An elaborate and careful discussion will
be found in G. H. Palmer's Nature of Goodness.
CHAPTER VIII
THE MEANING OF DUTY
Why are there conflicts between duty and inclination?
IF virtue is simply conduct that makes most truly for happiness, why
are not all but fools virtuous? The answer is, in a word, because what
will bring about the greatest good in the long run, and to the most
people, is not always what the individual desires at the moment. The
two great temptations are the lure of the selfish and the lure of the
immediate. To purchase one's own happiness at the expense of others,
and to purchase present satisfaction by an act which will bring less
good in the end-these are the cardinal sins, and under these two
heads every specific sin can be put. The root of the trouble is that,
in spite of the superposition of conscience upon their primitive
impulses, human organisms have not yet motor-mechanisms fully adjusted
to their individual or combined needs. Some instincts are over-strong,
others under-developed, none is delicately enough attuned to the
changing possibilities of the situation. Our desires tug toward all
sorts of acts which would prove disastrous either to ourselves or
others. Many of our faults we commit "without realizing it"; we follow
our impulses blindly, unconscious of their treachery. Other sins we
commit knowingly, because in spite of warning voices we cannot resist
the momentary desire. Readjustment of our impulses is always painful;
it is easier and pleasanter to yield than to control.
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