[6] It can be at least said on behalf of the Canadian militia that their condition was no worse than that of the militia of the United States. In 1906 Mr President Taft (then Secretary for War) contributed a preface to a pamphlet by Mr Huidekoper on the United States Army. Mr Taft then wrote:-- "Our confidence in ourselves and in our power of quickly adapting circumstances to meet any national emergency so far has carried away some of our public men so that they have been deliberately blind to the commonest and most generally accepted military principles, and they have been misled by the general success or good luck which has attended us in most of our wars. The awful sacrifice of life and money which we had to undergo during the four years in order to train our civil war veterans and to produce that army is entirely forgotten, and the country is lulled into the utterly unfounded assurance that a volunteer enlisted to-day, or a militiaman enrolled to-morrow, can in a week or month be made an effective soldier. The people of this country and the Government of this country, down to the time of the Spanish War, had pursued a policy which seemed utterly to ignore the lessons of the past." Mr Huidekoper (an acknowledged expert) maintained:-- "Judged by purely military standards, the invasion of Cuba was a trivial affair; but never in modern times has there been an expedition which contained so many elements of weakness; that it succeeded at all is, indeed, a marvel. The disorders of demoralisation and incapacity which attended the opening operations were nothing but the logical outcome of the unwillingness of Congress to prepare for war until the last possible moment, and merely demonstrated once again the utterly vicious system to which our legislators have persistently bound us, by neglecting to provide a force of thoroughly trained soldiers either large enough or elastic enough to meet the requirements of war as well as peace, supported by a militia which has previously had sufficient training to make it, when called out as volunteers, fairly dependable against the regular forces of other nations." Then in 1911, Mr Dickinson, U.S. Secretary for War, in an official report, condemned absolutely the U.S. militia on the grounds that: "It is lacking in proper proportions of cavalry, field artillery, engineer, signal corps and sanitary troops; it is not fully or properly organised into the higher units, brigades and divisions; it has no reserve supplies of arms and field equipment to raise its units from a peace to a war footing; it is so widely scattered throughout the country as to make its prompt concentration impossible; its personnel is deficient in training; it is to a degree deficient in physical stamina, and has upon its rolls a large number of men who by reason of their family relations and business responsibilities cannot be counted upon for service during any long period of war."