Psychological WarfareLinebarger, Paul Myron Anthony
History
Psychological Warfare
Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony
Psychological warfare
=Opinion Analysis.= In a favorable intelligence situation, espionage can
succeed in running a Gallup poll along the enemy's Main Street. When
this is done, the active propaganda operator has some very definite
issues at hand on which he can begin work. When it is not possible to
send the cloak-and-dagger boys walking up and down the Boulevard of the
Martyrs of the Eleventh of July, propanal, properly handled, can produce
almost the same result. The opinion of the enemy can be figured out in
terms of what enemy propaganda is trying to do.
To be useful, opinion analysis must be systematic. For a while the
author had the interesting job of interviewing all the latest arrivals
from Tokyo at a certain headquarters. The travelers would usually be
pumped up with a sense of their own smartness in having evaded the
Japanese and arrived at Allied territory. You could almost hear them
thinking, "Oh, boy, if Gendarmerie Chief Bakayama could only see me
now!" They were ready, in Army parlance, to spill their guts. The only
item on which most of them maintained one-man security was the question,
"Why, chum, did you yourself go to Tokyo in the first place?" Outside of
that, they were eager to talk. (Some of them had frightfully good
reasons to be eager; the adverb is literal.) With such sources of
information, the author thought that he could find out in short order
what the Japanese were thinking.
He found out, all right. He found out every single time. The refugee
engineer said the Japanese were so depressed that there was a bull
market in butcher knives. The absconding dairyman said the Japanese
were ready to die with gloom. The eloping wife said she never saw happy
Japanese any more. The military school deserter said the Japanese lay
awake all night every night listening for American air raids. The
reformed puppet said the Japanese had just gone to pieces. Then each of
them grinned (the interviews were individual, of course), and expected
to be patted on the head for bringing such good news.
[Illustration: _Figure 35: Informational Sheet._ This British leaflet
combines a message for Arabs with instructions for British pilots forced
down in the desert. The propaganda content is closely associated with
the practical mission of the leaflet.]
Their comments were worthless. What the enemy thinks _in general_ is
worth nothing unless your troops are already in his suburbs. What an
informant thinks the enemy thinks is worth even less. What do you,
reader, think right now? What do you think you think? See? the question
is nonsensical. To work, it has to be specific: What do you think about
the price of new suits? What do you think about Senator O'May and
Congressman MacNaples? Do you think that we will ever have to fight
Laputa? Are you satisfied with your present rate of pay? Why?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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