In estimating the propaganda situation, the vulnerability of the leaders to personal attack is one of the major elements. Properly handled, it can be of real value. In the American Revolution, the personal character of George Washington was a very substantial asset. A. very rich man, he could scarcely be accused of a gutter revolution. A slave owner, he could not be accused of wanting the overthrow of the social order. An experienced soldier, he could not be attacked as a military amateur. A man of patience, correct manners, and genuine modesty, he was not easily described as a bloody empire-builder, an immoral sycophant, or a power-drunk madman. British propaganda accordingly went after the Continental Congress, of which there was a great deal to be said. On the other side, the Americans had duck soup when it came to George III and most of his Cabinet--personalities which included boors, fuddy-duddies, too-little-and-too-laters, and conspicuous nincompoops. =A Written Estimate of the Situation.= If, as indicated above, the terrain of Psychological Warfare consists of the private thoughts and feelings of each member of the audience reached; if the mission of Psychological Warfare is the accomplishment of anything from entirely unknowable results (such as an imperceptible change of mood) all the way through to complete success (such as organized mass surrender); if the capabilities of the enemy have virtually nothing to do with one's own Psychological Warfare commitments; and if the decision consists of choices of means and theme--if these peculiarities all apply, the usual "estimate of the situation" has almost nothing to do with military propaganda. Roughly speaking, this is the case. An attempt to apply the outline given in FM 101-5, Appendix I, would produce only a lamentable parody of a military document. The _situation_ of the military unit possessing Psychological Warfare facilities has relatively little to do with the _capabilities_ of the Psychological Warfare unit. The morale of one's own men should have no effect whatever on the output of the radio script writers and the leaflet writers. In combat operations, military forces _meet_. In Psychological Warfare, they do not. In combat operations, it is impossible for two hostile units to occupy the _same_ territory for any length of time without both of them degenerating into a chaos of armed mobs. In Psychological Warfare operations, both sets of operations can be conducted in the same media, can address themselves to the same basic human appeals, can use the same music, the same general kind of news account, and so on.