Most of this counteracting propaganda was not counterpropaganda, technically speaking. It was not designed against _Allied_ propaganda, but for _German_ morale. Morale-building was not left to occasional recreational facilities, newspapers for troops, USO entertainment and the like, but was compelled through the use of internal espionage, affirmative presentation of the German case, and unified informational operations. This German tactical defensive psychological warfare was neither a total success nor a total failure; insofar as it helped the Wehrmacht hold out, it aided the last-ditch Nazi war effort. [Illustration: _Figure 62: Basic Types: Labor Recruitment._ On occasion, civilian labor becomes a highly critical factor even in an area of active operations. Leaflets can urge labor to strike against the enemy; they can also induce labor to come over and get to work. This leaflet was dropped on the Burmese, Shans, and Kachins, showing all the good things of life, promising high wages and bonuses and adding that, anyhow, it was patriotic. Come work for the Allies!] The American army did not employ defensive psychological warfare in World War II. Troop indoctrination was extremely spotty. American morale remained good, not because it was _made_ good by professionals who knew their job, but because Providence and the American people had brought up a generation of young men who started out well and--since the situation never approached hopelessness--kept on going with their spirits high. For the future, the American and British armies face the problem of devising arrangements whereby within the limits of a free society soldiers can be affirmatively indoctrinated in the course of operations. USO, Red Cross, public relations, information and education at home, morale staffs in the theaters, Armed Forces Radio Service, OWI, the American press and the overseas military papers--these went their separate and uncorrelated ways without doing any harm, _last time_. If the next war starts, as it may, with an initial interchange of terrifying strategic bombardments, the morale situation may be inherently less healthy. Wise planning would provide, perhaps, a single chain of command for public relations, military propaganda and morale services--extending this all the way down to the platoon, if necessary--to make sure that the "national line" on any given topic is explained, presented, repeated, and (if necessary) enforced. Such defensive psychological warfare might work against sensational enemy black operations, against attempted political division, and against fabrication of the news--provided it was carried out in an expert fashion. It could not change morale deterioration resulting from practical deterioration within the troop unit itself, except to decelerate the rate of decline. It would not make up for poor leadership. Nothing makes up for poor leadership.