For example, a well trained liaison officer might receive a call from a regimental or battalion commander. He would find that the commander desired leaflets to be used in a particular tactical situation. He should be able to explain what standard ready-prepared leaflets were available, what delay would be involved in making up special leaflets, and what quantities of leaflets would be advisable. Turning back to his home headquarters, he should be able to present the commander's case to the leaflet printers or the public-address team, and should help the propaganda people in understanding the commander's problems. =Mechanics of Liaison.= The mechanics of liaison depend in each case on the Psychological Warfare unit. Some had extensive networks of liaison officers; others had virtually none. In China during 1943-44, the most minor tactical request for a leaflet had to be channeled all the way back to Theater Forward Echelon Headquarters, because the political situation was so touchy, the Chinese language so difficult, printing facilities so scarce, and qualified personnel so rare that there was no point in having channels cut across lower down. In France and Belgium, during 1944-45, Psychological Warfare units were established on a considerable scale at the army level, and liaison officers were widely scattered; it was possible for regimental or battalion commanders to make direct requests of liaison officers. =Radio Support.= On rare occasions, it becomes possible for radio support to be given a specific unit. The American standard-wave broadcasting station was set up in the vicinity of Lorient while that French port, still held by the Nazis, was under American siege. The _History of the 2d Mobile Broadcasting Company_[43] describes the operation as being ... the first attempt to coordinate artillery, leaflet and radio propaganda. The station had learned the location of the billets of various [Nazi] units in the town, together with the names of their key personnel. With this information, a "game" was arranged with the artillery. One day, at a certain time, these units were addressed by name and their members were told to go outside their buildings and five minutes later they would receive a message. Precisely, five minutes later, leaflet shells released the messages advising surrender. The ability of the Americans to do things like that impressed the German soldiers with their hopeless position more than words. Obviously, such an operation required close contact with the enemy, plus known possession of standard-wave radio receivers by enemy personnel.