The military relationship had been clarified. The War Department, acting through G-2, had reestablished a psychological warfare office under the new name of Propaganda Branch, under the successive commands of Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stanley, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Buttles, and Colonel Dana W. Johnston. The new branch undertook no operations whatever, but connected War Department with OWI and OSS for policy and liaison, and represented one-half of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (an appropriate naval officer from a comparable office representing the other half) at the weekly policy meetings of OWI. Military needs in psychological warfare had been settled by regarding the Theaters in this respect as autonomous, and leaving to the respective Theater Commanders the definition of their relationships with OWI and OSS, and their use of each. OSS and OWI had passed the stage of rival growth, and consulted one another enough to prevent operational interference. Each had sufficient military or naval supervision to prevent interference with cryptographic security, communication and deception operations. =The Lessons.= The major job of psychological warfare passed to the Theaters. In some theaters this was kept by the commander directly under his own immediate supervision, and OWI was used simply as a propaganda service of supply. In others, OWI was an almost independent agent. In some places, OWI worked with OSS as in the European Theater, in others independently, as in the China-Burma-India Theater. In one, it worked completely without OSS (SWPA), since General MacArthur did not let OSS into his Theater at all. (OSS got in the general area anyhow; with Navy permission, it turned up blithely, highly nautical on Saipan.) These Theater establishments were the ones that set up local standard-wave programs which the enemy could hear in volume. They provided the loudspeaker units which were taken right into combat. They serviced the ground and air combat echelons with leaflets as needed. They moved along behind the advances, opening up information booths and explaining to liberated natives why each did not get the four freedoms, the three meals a day, and the new pair of shoes he thought he had been promised by the American radio. These military establishments are better described under operations, since it was their functioning which defined--down to the limit of present-day experience--American military doctrine concerning the conduct of psychological warfare in theaters of war. In concluding the historical summary of psychological warfare, it is interesting to look at three major points which emerge plainly from the experience of World War II--points which either were not discovered in World War I, or else failed to make an impact on the minds of the responsible officials and informed citizens.