In these ambiguous cases it is interesting to note that perception is rarely abortive; _some_ perception takes place. The two discrepant sets of associates do not neutralize each other or mix and make a blur. What we more commonly get is first one object in its completeness, and then the other in its completeness. In other words, _all brain-processes are such as give rise to what we may call_ FIGURED _consciousness_. If paths are shot-through at all, they are shot-through in consistent systems, and occasion thoughts of definite objects, not mere hodge-podges of elements. Even where the brain's functions are half thrown out of gear, as in aphasia or dropping asleep, this law of figured consciousness holds good. A person who suddenly gets sleepy whilst reading aloud will read wrong; but instead of emitting a mere broth of syllables, he will make such mistakes as to read 'supper-time' instead of 'sovereign,' 'overthrow' instead of 'opposite,' or indeed utter entirely imaginary phrases, composed of several definite words, instead of phrases of the book. So in aphasia: where the disease is mild the patient's mistakes consist in using entire wrong words instead of right ones. It is only in grave lesions that he becomes quite inarticulate. These facts show how subtle is the associative link; how delicate yet how strong that connection among brain-paths which makes any number of them, once excited together, thereafter tend to vibrate as a systematic whole. A small group of elements, '_this_,' common to two systems, _A_ and _B_, may touch off _A_ or _B_ according as accident decides the next step (see Fig. 63). If it happen that a single point leading from '_this_' to _B_ is momentarily a little more pervious than any leading from '_this_' to _A_, then that little advantage will upset the equilibrium in favor of the entire system _B_. The currents will sweep first through that point and thence into all the paths of _B_, each increment of advance making _A_ more and more impossible. The thoughts correlated with _A_ and _B_, in such a case, will have objects different, though similar. The similarity will, however, consist in some very limited feature if the 'this' be small. _Thus the faintest sensations will give rise to the perception of definite things if only they resemble those which the things are wont to arouse._ [Illustration: FIG. 63.]