Both groups of facts which we have studied so far, have dealt with
processes which were indeed not conscious but which we had no right to
call subconscious inasmuch as they contained no mental process at all
but only physiological dispositions and actions. We turn finally to the
other smaller and more abnormal group of so-called subconscious facts in
which the facts are mental indeed and not only physiological, but not at
all outside of consciousness and thus again not subconscious. A
conscious fact may easily suggest the appeal to subconscious theories to
those who have accepted such theories for other reasons. There are, for
instance, plenty of mental experiences which we do not notice or which
we do not recognize. Yet if we find later that they must have influenced
our mind, we are easily inclined to refer them to subconscious activity.
But it is evident that to be content of consciousness means not at all
necessarily to be object of attention or object of recognition.
Awareness does not involve interest. If I hear a musical sound, I may
not recognize at all the overtones which are contained in it. As soon as
I take resonators and by them reenforce the loudness of those overtones,
they become vivid for me and I can now notice them well even when the
resonators are removed. I surely was aware of them, that is, had them in
consciousness all the time but there were no contrast feelings and no
associations in consciousness which gave them sufficient clearness to
attract attention.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account