Race Distinctions in American LawStephenson, Gilbert Thomas
History
Race Distinctions in American Law
Stephenson, Gilbert Thomas
African Americans -- Politics and government; Law -- United States -- History; United States -- Race relations
In 1894, the “Jim Crow” law of Kentucky was declared unconstitutional by
the Federal Circuit Court[560] because the language of the acts was so
comprehensive as to embrace all passengers, whether their passage
commenced or ended within the State or otherwise and thus interfered
with interstate commerce. Four years later, however, the Court of
Appeals[561] of Kentucky, considering the same statute, ruled that the
law of that State was not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or
the “interstate commerce clause” of the Federal Constitution, arguing
that, if it did apply to interstate passengers, which was not conceded,
it would be construed to apply only to transportation within the State.
Under this latter ruling apparently the colored passenger going from
West Virginia to Indiana through Kentucky would have to ride in the car
provided for his race in that State.
The same year, 1898, the Supreme Court[562] of Tennessee held that it
was a proper exercise of the police power to require even interstate
passengers to occupy separate accommodations while in that State. The
last case[563] upon this point, decided April 16, 1907, held that a
railroad company may, independently of statute, adopt and enforce rules
requiring colored passengers, although they are interstate passengers,
to occupy separate coaches or compartments.
Thus the matter stands. In the absence of a recent United States Supreme
Court decision upon the point, it would be unsafe to make a
generalization. But it is clear that there has been, in the point of
view of the Federal judiciary, a reaction from the extreme doctrine of
Hall v. DeCuir. All the lower courts, both State and Federal, are
inclined to make the laws apply to all passengers, both intrastate and
interstate, so long as they are within the borders of the particular
State.
_Sleeping Cars_
In a number of the “Jim Crow” laws there are special provisions about
Pullman cars. Oklahoma and Texas provide that carriers may haul sleeping
or chair cars for the exclusive use of either race separately, but not
jointly. Georgia goes farthest in legislation on this point. In 1899,
the legislature provided that, in assigning seats and berths on sleeping
cars, white and colored passengers must be separated; but declared that
nothing in the act should be construed to compel sleeping-car companies
to carry persons of color in sleeping or parlor cars. The act does not
apply to nurses and servants with their employers, who may enter and
ride in the car with their employers. The conductors are made special
policemen to enforce the law, and the failure or refusal to do so is
punishable as a misdemeanor. The “Jim Crow” laws in Maryland, North
Carolina, and Virginia do not apply to Pullman cars or to through
express trains; nor, in South Carolina, to through vestibule trains.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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