Railroads -- United States; Railroads -- United States -- Finance
We have now the reorganization in its final shape, and it will be
interesting to review briefly the gradual way in which this shape was
fashioned. With the company plunged anew into bankruptcy after a
reorganization insufficient to afford any genuine relief, the proposal
was made to fund one-half the general mortgage coupons for three years
and to convert all junior claims into liens on income. This scheme
failed because plainly inadequate to meet the needs of the situation,
and a modified version was presented providing for an assessment with
which to pay the floating debt. The assessment was approved, but not
the plan, and an ensuing scheme supplied an altogether new method
of treatment, whereby on the one hand the assessment was made more
heavy, and on the other two classes of preferred stock were proposed,
with one issue of bonds at 3 per cent. This plan failed, not so much
because of its inadequacy, although it was inadequate, but because
general mortgage bondholders felt that a 3 per cent bond was less than
they could reasonably expect for their holdings, and insisted on a
security with a higher obligatory rate of interest. The next plan took
note of these objections: it raised the interest on the bonds which it
proposed from 3 to 4 per cent; and in the endeavor to please the junior
bondholders as well, created four classes of preferred stock, by means
of which the relative priority of different issues was carefully and
completely recognized. Assessments were retained, and a guarantee by
a syndicate and a voting trust for five years was suggested. In the
discussion that followed, a new scheme was introduced, which replaced
the preferred stock by two classes of income bonds, and forced the
managers to realize the desire of the old bondholders for some new
security with at least the name of bond. As a result, the syndicate
which had fathered the previous plan consented to substitute for
three of their classes of stock first, second, and third preference
bonds. Meanwhile the fixed charges estimated for the successive plans
steadily decreased. The first looked for $12,911,000, or $14,266,051
as variously reckoned; the second for $14,143,384, or, deducting the
Jersey Central, for $8,223,177; the third for $7,064,830; the fourth
for $6,971,687; and the sixth for $6,583,055. Thus each plan took over
what was most satisfactory in its predecessor; and there was on the one
hand a steady decrease in the fixed charges proposed, and on the other
a continuous effort to discover some plan which might be satisfactory
to all concerned.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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