North of the Ogden-San Francisco line the conditions were less satisfactory. The Great Northern and the Northern Pacific were here supreme, and in 1901 were negotiating for the purchase of the Burlington to give them an entrance into Chicago. Mr. Harriman asked for a share in this purchase but was refused. He thereupon began to buy Northern Pacific stock in the endeavor to secure by this a half control in the more eastern road. It was the struggle which then ensued between Mr. Harriman and Mr. Hill which caused the stock exchange panic of May, 1901, and which resulted in the formation of the Northern Securities Company, in which Mr. Harriman was allotted a large though not a controlling interest. On the breakup of the Northern Securities Company the Union Pacific received back some $25,000,000 in Great Northern and $32,000,000 in Northern Pacific shares,[534] worth at market prices about $100,000,000.[535] This Northern Securities episode had little effect on traffic conditions in the Northwest, but it did profoundly influence the financial policy of the Union Pacific during the following years.[536] The dissolution of the Northern Securities Company gave to the Union Pacific Great Northern and Northern Pacific shares, which were valuable as investments only. And as investments these stocks soon became undesirable. We have said that the combined value of the securities transferred approximated $100,000,000 at the time of transfer. From that time on the stocks appreciated in value till they were worth from $145,000,000 to $150,000,000, and yielded an income of less than 3 per cent on their market price. It was good policy to sell them, and $118,000,000 worth were accordingly disposed of, leaving some $30,000,000 worth still in the hands of the company.[537] What should be done with the enormous resources thus secured? Some of the cash was used to buy Chicago & Alton stock,—some of it was put out in demand loans. But beginning with June 30, 1906, the Union Pacific and Oregon Short Line began investment in stocks of other companies on a great scale. $41,442,028 were put into Illinois Central stock; $10,395,000 into Atchison preferred; $45,466,960 into Baltimore & Ohio, common and preferred; $19,634,280 into New York Central; and lesser amounts into Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul, Chicago & Northwestern, St. Joseph & Grand Island, and other companies. In all, $131,693,271 were invested during a little over seven months.[538] This has been the characteristic feature of recent Union Pacific finance. The large purchases of stock in other roads have assured it favorable connections in the Illinois Central and in the Baltimore & Ohio, and have modified the severity of competition with the Atchison.[539] Including the Southern Pacific, its system reaches from Chicago to Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and the Gulf, and has an influential voice in two of the principal roads connecting Chicago with the Atlantic seaboard.