The plan marks sufficiently well the advance which had been made since the reorganization of 1880–3. The best that could then be imagined had been the creation of a grand general mortgage for which the old bondholders might, but mostly did not, exchange their holdings; while now the very first suggestion endeavored to retain for all bondholders a chance for the same return as before, and found the salvation of the company in the transformance of certain bonds from mortgage to debenture obligations. The general criticisms which may be made are three: first, that it was unwise to defer all provision for the floating debt; second, that the new income bonds might better have been replaced by stock; and third, that the probable reduction in fixed charges would have been insufficient. So far as the committee suggested any action in relation to the floating debt, it favored a funding of it. This funding might have been either into mortgage or into income bonds: if the former, the fixed charges of the company would have been increased, or else the other mortgage bondholders would have been compelled to accept a lower rate of interest; if the latter, the volume of securities of slight value would have been increased, or the junior securities would have had to take less for their holdings. The action taken would have gone far to determine what classes of securities would assent, while in the absence of definite declaration it was on the whole likely that all classes would hold off. As for the income bonds, it is in general true that they are an unsatisfactory sort of security, and likely to hinder the legitimate increase of capital. Most important was the question of fixed charges. It will be remembered that of the first and second series 5s of the previous reorganization only $23,500,000 had been intended for immediate sale, and that of these but a portion had been disposed of; and yet these consols were the only securities the nature of which was really changed by the Whelen plan. Interest had been optional before on the income bonds, the convertible bonds, the convertible adjustment scrip, debenture and deferred income bonds; interest was not made optional on the general mortgage or prior liens. The result would not have been, in spite of the reduction in rents and the scaling of the divisional coal mortgages, any sufficient lessening of the fixed requirements. This fact was, moreover, perceived. The board of managers, to whom the scheme was reported, concluded a favorable opinion with the declaration, “to conclude, we are satisfied that the large economies already in operation, with those which are still being introduced, should be regarded as a margin to meet adverse contingencies.... That the revenue we reckon on, though reasonably certain under such reorganization, will surely not be realized in case the property should be torn asunder by foreclosure sale.”[210] In other words they relied, much as Mr. Gowen had done