Railroads: Rates and RegulationsRipley, William Zebina
History
Railroads: Rates and Regulations
Ripley, William Zebina
Railroads -- Freight -- Rates -- United States; Railroads and state -- United States
commercial competition between it and the place more distant.
An important feature in commercial competition is its entire
dissociation from all considerations of cost of service by long or
short routes. Neither strong nor weak lines make the rate. The business
is there. Market conditions are fixed. The carriers are free to take
traffic or leave it. Single-handed, at least they cannot rule the
price of transportation. The price of sugar at Kansas City is made
by competition of Louisiana sugar coming from New Orleans, of beet
sugar and Hawaiian sugar from Colorado and San Francisco, and of the
world's sugar from New York. This is why Kansas City, in the complaint
stated in the opening paragraph, enjoys a lower rate on sugar from San
Francisco than the transcontinental lines can accord to Denver. The
only possible justification for the apparent anomaly in lumber rates
from Texas points, cited in the same paragraph, is that, as the heart
of the Middle West is approached, lumber supplies from every point of
the compass converge upon common markets. As is so frequently averred
in such cases, no carrier makes the rate. The rate is made for all of
them by conditions beyond their control. The only rates, therefore,
which it is in their power to fix in some accordance with average costs
of operation, are the rates at local stations. For these rates alone
can they be brought to book.
Just here another characteristic of commercial competition as distinct
from rivalry of routes is to be noted. Local discrimination, wherever
it is alleged to occur, frequently assumes the form of complaint
against rates to various places, not on the same line but by different
and often widely separated lines. Complaints of this class might
arise, for instance, referring back to our diagrams of the oyster
cases, between X and Z. Philadelphia, we will assume, as before, to
be the common market. A multitude of different varieties of protest
are distinguishable. Point X equally distant from Philadelphia with Z
may pay a higher rate than Z. Or X may be less distant than Z, and yet
be called upon to pay the same rate. It may even be less distant than
Z and yet actually be charged a higher rate than Z. But in all these
instances the two points (X and Z) are not on the same route, but on
divergent routes. The issue remains the same. The conditions imposed
at the point of convergence being fixed, each line must exercise its
own ingenuity in conforming thereto. Methods in each case must differ,
according to the length of line, the direction and composition of the
traffic, and other factors.
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