it would not be so in others, and what degree of favour can be lawfully shown to some person to the prejudice of others under the pressure of competition can only be decided in any case that arises by reference to its special circumstances.”[101] In still later judgments there is a faint recognition of the fact that the existence of competition ought to be taken into account; _e.g._, in _Richardson_ v. _Midland Railway Company_, decided in 1881 (4 N. and M. 1) the Commissioners say: “The difference (between the Burton and Newark rates) or part of it, may possibly be required by the route from the same district, not being the same all the way to the two places, and by the separate portions of line passed over being more costly to work or construct in the one case than in the other; or, again, may be required by a competition for the conveyance of the particular traffic between the two termini, existing in one case but not in the other. They proceed to speak of “due allowance for such causes of difference,” which implies that allowance must be made for both of such causes. But in the _Broughton Coal Company’s_ case (4 N. and M. p. 191, 1883) the Commissioners use somewhat different language. They observe that “if goods of the same kind are carried to the same destination over the same railway for distances that are not the same, and the gross charge from the intermediate distance is as great as from the more distant one, there is a preference of one traffic over the other within the meaning of the Traffic Act of 1854; and that it is not sufficient to rebut this presumption to show that the charge for the longer distance has been reduced to meet a competition from another route.” Lately the Commissioners have, to say the least, lost sight of the element of competition in determining rates; and in all the applications to them, there is no clear instance in which they have found the circumstances in which it ought, in their opinion, to operate. [98] In Lees _v._ Lancashire & Yorkshire, 1 N. & M. 352, the Commissioners relied to some extent upon a principle which they do not appear to have since put in force. The question was whether the company gave an undue and unreasonable preference to the Corporation. The Commissioners said that undoubtedly a preference had been given, but they declined to say it was unreasonable (1) because the Corporation did not compete with the complainants; (2) because _the preference was for the public benefit and convenience_ (p. 367); (3) because of the nature and magnitude of the coal traffic of the Corporation. [99] 2 N. & M. 39. [100] See the head note on the case, and the language of Williams, J.; also the observations of Cockburn, C. J. in Harris _v._ Cockermouth and Workington Railway Company, I. N. and M., p. 703. The latter judge, referring to “fair and sufficient reasons” for differences in rates, says, “As, for instance, in respect of terminal traffic, there might be competition with another railway.”