From the foregoing remarks it will, I think, be evident that our policy was not only somewhat rash, but was not altogether straightforward. In the first place, we undertook the expedition with an inadequate force, chiefly comprised of native troops, raised on the spot, at a late season of the year, and without sufficient preparations as to supplies and transport; in the next, we attempted to march through a country inhabited by tribes with whom we had no cause of quarrel, and from whom we carefully concealed our intentions. The result of the first day's march (October 20) brought matters to a climax, and instead of being able to cut off the 'Sitana' fanatics, we found ourselves face to face with the Bonair and other tribes, whose territory we had invaded, and who, scoffing at our professed strategy, at once united and determined if possible to drive us out of their country. The whole condition of affairs was thus entirely altered, and General Chamberlain found himself holding the end of a narrow gorge, with steep mountains running up several thousand feet on either side, and attacked incessantly day and night, not only in front, but on either flank. In the meantime another unfortunate circumstance had occurred. It so happened that towards the end of October both the Viceroy and Sir Hugh Rose had left Simla, on short expeditions towards the distant ranges of the Himalayas. Accidentally I had seen Lord Elgin when he started, and he appeared to be in good health; soon afterwards, however, owing, it was supposed, to his having ascended and crossed some high passes, or whatever the cause, he suddenly became dangerously ill with an affection of the heart, and when he arrived at Drumsala in the Kangra Valley, his case was deemed hopeless. Sir Hugh also, for the moment, was almost out of reach, but on hearing of the untoward development of the military operations, he at once proceeded to Lahore, where his staff joined him in November. The successive despatches of General Chamberlain give a clear account of the altered condition of affairs. Writing on October 23, he said: 'The Bonair people having thus taken a hostile part against us is extremely serious, and has altered our whole position and probably our plan of operations.' He then goes on to explain the necessity of guarding his communications through the pass, and asks for reinforcements. Again, on October 25, he writes: 'There appears to be reason to believe that the Bonair people have applied to the Akoond of Swat for aid, and should they succeed in enlisting him in their cause--which is not improbable, as they are his spiritual followers--the object with which this force took the road to the Chumla Valley would be still more difficult of attainment.' FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 55: October 19, 1863.] [Footnote 56: Meaning the English.] CHAPTER XVIII HARD FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS