Records, by Admiral of the Fleet, Lord FisherFisher, John Arbuthnot Fisher, Baron
History
Records, by Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher
Fisher, John Arbuthnot Fisher, Baron
Admirals -- Great Britain -- Biography; Fisher, John Arbuthnot Fisher, Baron, 1841-1920; Great Britain. Royal Navy
Wireless was voted damnable by all the armchair sailors when we
put it on the roof of the Admiralty, and yet we heard what one
ship (the “Argyll”) at Bombay was saying to another (the “Black
Prince”) at Gibraltar.
“Flying machines are a physical impossibility,” said a very
great scientist four years ago. To-day they are as plentiful as
sparrows.
“Submarines are only playthings!” was the official remark of
our Chief Admiral afloat only a little while ago, and yet now
submarines are talked of as presently ousting Dreadnoughts.
The above texts, extracted from comparatively modern naval
history (history is a record of exploded ideas!), should make
anyone chary of ridiculing the writer when he repeats:
THE SUBMARINE IS THE COMING TYPE OF WAR VESSEL FOR SEA FIGHTING.
And what is it that the coming of the submarine really means?
It means that the whole foundation of our traditional naval
strategy, which served us so well in the past, has been broken
down! The foundation of that strategy was blockade. The Fleet
did not exist merely to win battles--that was the means, not
the end. The ultimate purpose of the Fleet was to make blockade
possible for us and impossible for our enemy. Where that
situation was set up we could do what we liked with him on the
sea, and, despite a state of war, England grew steadily richer.
But with the advent of the long-range ocean-going submarine
that has all gone! Surface ships can no longer either maintain
or prevent blockade, and with the conception of blockade are
broken up all the consequences, direct and indirect, that used
to flow from it. All our old ideas of strategy are simmering in
the melting pot! Can we get anything out of it which will let
us know where we are and restore to us something of our former
grip? It is a question that must be faced.
* * * * *
Sea-fighting of to-day, or at any time, entails the removal of
the enemy’s sea forces. If, as is maintained, the submarine
proves itself at once the most efficient factor for this
purpose and also the most difficult sea force to remove, let us
clear our minds of all previous obsessions and acknowledge the
facts once and for all.
HOSTILE SUBMARINES.
_It has to be freely acknowledged that at the present time no
means exist of preventing hostile submarines emerging from
their own ports and cruising more or less at will._
It is, moreover, only barely possible that, in the future,
mining and other blocking operations on a very extensive scale
may so develop as to render their exit very hazardous; but it
is plain that such operations would require a large personnel,
unceasing energy and vigilance, and an immense quantity of
constantly replaceable materials.
* * * * *
THE SUBMARINE AND COMMERCE.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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