In this connection it may also be observed that where one belligerent departs from the rules of civilised warfare, it is open to the other to take one of two courses. He may secure a moral advantage by refusing to follow a bad lead, or he may seek a physical advantage by forcing the enemy’s crime to its utmost consequences. _By the half measures we have adopted hitherto in regard to open-sea mines, we are enjoying neither the one advantage nor the other._ On the general idea of breaking up the German war plan by operations in the Baltic, it may be recalled that it is not new to us. It was attempted--but a little too late--during Napoleon’s Friedland-Eylau campaign. It was again projected in 1854, when our operations in the Great War after Trafalgar, and particularly in the Peninsula, were still living memories. In that year we sent a Fleet into the Baltic with the idea of covering the landing of a French force within striking distance of Petrograd, which was to act in combination with the Prussian army; but as Prussia held back, the idea was never carried out. Still, the mere presence of our Fleet--giving colour to the menace--did avail to keep a very large proportion of the Russian strength away from the Crimea, and so materially hastened the successful conclusion of the war. On this analogy, it is for consideration whether, even if the suggested operation is not feasible, a menace of carrying it out--concerted with Russia--might not avail seriously to disturb German equilibrium and force her to desperate expedients, even to hazarding a Fleet action or to alienating entirely the Scandinavian Powers by drastic measures of precaution. The risks, of course, must be serious; but unless we are fairly sure that the passive pressure of our Fleet is really bringing Germany to a state of exhaustion, _risks must be taken to use our command of the Sea with greater energy_; or, so far as the actual situation promises, we can expect no better issue for the present war than that which the continental coalition was forced to accept in the Seven Years’ War. _Lord Fisher to Mr. Lloyd George._ 36, BERKELEY SQUARE, LONDON, _March 28th, 1917_. DEAR PRIME MINISTER,