Nelson could not leave Toulon with all his Fleet for nearly four months out of the year! No! he stayed there for two years without putting his foot on shore! What he did was to send one or two ships away at a time to get provisions and water, and to effect any needed repairs. Let us do the same! We want a fixed base for each Fleet (and so fixed for war reasons). Thus, for example, the Channel Fleet at Gibraltar, the Home Fleet at Bantry, or the Forth, and so on. But this is going into unnecessary detail, and anticipating other parts of the scheme which must be adopted to make this work! Thus it will be seen later on, that to enable this great economy in money to be effected (_putting aside increase of fighting efficiency!_), we must have two years’ commissions! But we can’t have two years’ commissions unless we have fewer ships in commission! But we can’t have fewer ships in commission unless we have a redistribution of our Fleet! But we can’t have a redistribution of our Fleet until we rearrange our strategy! and this strategy, strange to say, depends on our reserves, and our reserves depend on a fresh allocation of our personnel, and on a fresh system of service. _We must have the new scheme of Long Service tempered by Short Service!_ And this again largely hangs on the types of fighting ships we are going to have! _But what is the type of ship?_ Not one that goes to the bottom in two minutes from the effect of one torpedo, and drowns nearly a thousand men, and takes three years to replace, and costs over a million sterling! _How many types do we want!_ This is quite easy to answer if we make up our minds _how we are going to fight_! Who has made up his mind? _How many of our Admirals have got minds?_ It will be obvious then that the whole of this business is a regular case of “the house that Jack built,” for one thing follows on another, _they are all interlaced and interdependent_! That’s why it was said to begin with:-- _The Scheme! The Whole Scheme!! And Nothing but the Scheme!!!_ One essential feature which has been overlooked must be mentioned before going further _because imperatively necessary to ensure instant readiness for war_, but it hangs on all the other points previously mentioned and which are going to be examined in detail. The reduction in the number of ships in commission _which is as necessary for fighting efficiency_ (_when the whole Navy is mobilised for war_) _as it is conducive to an immense economy must be accompanied by and associated with two vital requisites_: I. Every fighting ship in reserve must have a nucleus crew. II. The reinforcements for the fighting fleets and squadrons must be collected together while in the reserve at the most convenient ports and be placed under the Flag Officer who will take them to their war stations, and this Flag Officer to understand he will be shot like a dog in case of any inefficiency in these ships in war.