Of course objections will be raised, and it will be shown that the Navy cannot be run without them, but wipe them out, and in a year no one will remember that they ever existed. It is well to review generally our distant stations and the composition of their squadrons. The Navy and the country have grown so accustomed to the territorial nomenclature of our distant squadrons that their connection with the sea is considerably obscured, and their association with certain lands has led to a tacit belief that those particular squadrons are for the protection of the lands they frequent, and not generally for the destruction of the enemy’s fleet wherever it may happen to be. Of course no such idea is accepted by the Admiralty, but, in spite of the broad principles of strategy involved, certain fleets are composed largely with a view to work in restricted waters, which vessels would be a source of danger and weakness on the sudden outbreak of war with a combination of Powers. Take the combination of ships on each of the following stations: North America, Cape of Good Hope, East Indies, and Australia. Remember the “Variag.” What happened in the small area of the theatre of operations in the present war will be repeated in the larger theatre of operations of a conflict of European Powers when the whole world will be involved. What will happen to our “Odins,” “Redbreasts,” “Fantomes,” “Dwarfs,” etc.? aye! and what will happen to our “Scyllas,” “Katoombas,” and “Hyacinths,” if caught sight of by first class cruisers of modern armament on foreign stations?[7] Lucky if they can reach a neutral port, disarm, and have their crews interned for the remainder of the war. Lucky, indeed, if a far worse fate does not befall them. At all events, such wholesale scattering of the British foreign fleets would lead to irreparable loss of prestige among the smaller States where these little vessels were usually located. Now is there any necessity for such numbers of useless fighting ships? Cannot more efficient classes be substituted for them, or, at all events, some of them? What we have to face is the probability of a serious combination of strong Powers against us, for then we will be unable to spare two first class cruisers to go in search of individual enemy’s first class cruisers, who, if not caught, may sweep round and lick up or force into neutral ports all our inefficient small fry. Surely the three Atlantic squadrons should be of such strength as to be able to rendezvous and form a fleet more or less absolutely self-protective, to say nothing of being offensive. Such a squadron, under one admiral in war time, would be an effective Atlantic squadron, and would protect our interests by holding the ocean against enemy’s cruisers. Such squadrons can be formed without increasing the personnel of the Navy, and, moreover, the crews would be in ships that would be used in war instead of being in “floating anxieties.”