“The Kremlin reckons on a steadily progressive weakening of the
Atlantic group of powers. Meanwhile, it is intended to increase the
flow of warlike supplies and indirect help to Asiatic Communist
forces, rather than to the European satellites. Major developments
are timed to take place in Asia before the end of this year, which
by the middle of 1952, will give the USSR access to certain valuable
and essential raw materials which now have to be purchased from
outside the Soviet system.... The Kremlin thinks war with the West
will become inevitable ... but hopes to be able to postpone this war
until Burma and India have been brought within the Soviet sphere of
influence.”
To follow the MacArthur program has been called a “colossal gamble,”
but what greater gamble can there be than sitting back and waiting
for the enemy to come and destroy us? Was England able to stop
Hitler by appeasement? Nor will the present British Labor Government
be able to silence the Chinese Communists by promising them Formosa
and a hand in the Japanese peace treaty if, indeed, the Japanese
accept such a treaty.
Those who still believe that a “deal” can be made with Stalin or
Communists anywhere, just do not know the history of Communism or of
Communism’s forbears. MacArthur’s removal from the scene at this time
is cause for jubilation among the radically inclined the world over,
for this particular American hero was Stalin’s Enemy Number One.
Another great boon to the Chinese and Korean Reds is that Truman
has virtually promised them that their Manchurian bases will not be
bombed by us, unless of course, they step out of line and bomb us
first. Thus, they can continue to kill and maim our boys without fear
of too much retaliation on our part. We won two great victories on
the battlefields of World Wars I and II, but we lost them both at
conference tables. Political double-talk always gives the enemy a far
greater victory than could be won on the battlefield.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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