Had that large supply been sent to Hannibal with the same unanimity and despatch with which it was voted, it is more than probable, that so consummate a general would have soon been master of Rome, and transferred the empire of the world to Carthage. For the Romans were so exhausted after the terrible defeat at Cannæ, that Livy is of opinion, that Hannibal would have given the finishing blow to that republick, if he had marched directly to Rome from the field of battle, as he was advised to do by his general of horse Maherbal.[240] That many of the nobility upon the first news of this fatal event, were in actual consultation about the means of quitting Italy, and looking out for a settlement in some other part of the world, and he affirms, that the safety both of the city and empire of Rome must be attributed (as it was then firmly believed at Rome) to the delay of that single day only, on which Maherbal gave that advice to Hannibal. Appian confirms the distressful situation of the Roman affairs at that juncture, and informs us, that including the slaughter at Cannæ, in which the Romans had lost most of their ablest officers, Hannibal had put to the sword two hundred and fifty thousand of their best troops in the space of two years only, from the beginning of the second Punick war inclusive.[241] It is easy, therefore, to imagine how little able the Roman armies, consisting chiefly of new levies, would have been to face such a commander as Hannibal, when supported by the promised re-enforcement of sixty-four thousand fresh men, besides money and elephants in proportion. For Hannibal, though deprived of all supplies from Carthage by the malice of the Hannonian faction, maintained his ground above fourteen years more after his victory at Cannæ, in spite of the utmost efforts of the Romans. A truth which Livy himself acknowledges with admiration and astonishment at his superior military capacity. From that period therefore, after the battle of Cannæ, when Hannibal was first disappointed of the promised supplies from Carthage, we ought properly to date the fall of that republick, which must be wholly imputed to the inveterate malice of the profligate Hanno and his impious faction, who were determined, as Hannibal observed before, to ruin the contrary party, though by means which must be inevitably attended with the destruction of their country. Appian insinuates,[242] that Hannibal first engaged in this war more from the importunity of his friends, than even his own passion for military glory and hereditary hatred to the Romans. For Hanno and his faction (as Appian tells us) no longer dreading the power of Hamilcar and Asdrubal his son-in-law,[243] and holding Hannibal extremely cheap upon account of his youth, began to persecute and oppress the Barcan party with so much rage and hatred, that the latter were obliged by letter to implore assistance from Hannibal, and to assure him that his own interest and safety was inseparable from theirs.