At Carthage their military institution was entirely different. The power of the generals in the field was absolute and unlimited; and, if their conduct was approved of, generally continued to the end of whatever war they were engaged in. They had no occasion for the dangerous resource of a dictator. The watchful eye of their standing court-martial, the committee of one hundred and four of their ablest senators, was a perpetual, and never-failing check upon their ambition, or ill behavior of their generals.[358] The sacred cohort amongst the Carthaginians, consisted of a large body of volunteers of the richest and greatest families of the nation. This wise and noble institution was one of the chief supports of the Carthaginian state; and as it was the constant seminary of their officers and commanders, might very probably be one cause why luxury and effeminacy could never obtain footing in that warlike republick. For we always find this generous body giving the most signal instances of bravery and conduct,[359] and bearing down all before them.... Nor did they ever quit the field of battle, until they were deserted by the rest of the army, and even then generally retired in excellent order. The Romans were gradually trained up, from the very infancy of their republick, in long and obstinate wars with their Italian neighbours, who were masters of the same arms and disciplines, and were no way their inferiors in bravery. Nor did they perfect themselves in the art of war, until they learned it by bloody experience from Pyrrhus, the most consummate captain of that age. The Carthaginians were only exercised in war with the wild undisciplined Africans, or the irregular Spaniards, nor were they able with their numerous fleets and prodigious armies to complete the reduction of that part of Sicily, which was inhabited by Grecian colonies, who retained their native arms and discipline. Hence arose the great superiority of the Romans, both in soldiers and commanders. Though the Barcan family produced some great officers, who at least equalled the ablest generals Rome could ever boast of. It is evident from the course of this inquiry, that the ruin of the Roman republick arose wholly from internal causes. The ruin of Carthage was owing remotely to internal, but immediately to external. The Plebeian faction reduced Rome to the verge of ruin at the battle of Cannæ, and a complication of factions completed the subversion of that republick under the two triumvirates. The envy and jealousy of the Hannonian faction deprived Carthage of all the fruits of Hannibal’s amazing victories and progress, and paved the way for the utter excision of their very name and nation by the Roman arms. Such are the direful effects of faction, when suffered to run its natural lengths without control, in the most flourishing and best constituted government!... [330] Justin. lib. 18. c. 5. [331] Termed consuls by the Romans, _susetes_ by the Carthaginians.