Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republicks: Adapted to the Present State of Great BritainMontagu, Edward Wortley
Philosophy
Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republicks: Adapted to the Present State of Great Britain
Montagu, Edward Wortley
History, Ancient -- Philosophy; Republics
As Britain is so confessedly superior to all the maritime powers of the
ancients by the advantages of situation; so the British constitution, as
settled at the revolution, is demonstrably far preferable to, and better
formed for duration, than any of the most celebrated republicks of
antiquity. As the executive power is vested in a single person, who is
deemed the first branch in the legislature; and as that power is for
life and hereditary; our constitution is neither liable to those
frequent convulsions, which attended the annual elections of consuls,
nor to that solecism in politicks, two supreme heads of one body for
life, and hereditary, which was the great defect in the Spartan
institution. As the house of commons, elected by, and out of the body of
the people, is vested with all the power annexed to the tribunitial
office amongst the Romans; the people enjoy every advantage which ever
accrued to the Roman people by that institution, whilst the nation is
secure from all those calamitous seditions, in which every factious
tribune could involve his country at pleasure. And as all our questions
in parliament are decided by a majority of voices; we can never be
subject to that capital defect in the Carthaginian constitution, where
the single _veto_, of one discontented senator, referred the decision of
the most important affair to a wrong-headed, ungovernable populace. The
house of peers is placed in the middle of the balance, to prevent the
regal scale from preponderating to despotism or tyranny; or the
democratical to anarchy and its consequences. The equitable intent of
our laws is plainly calculated, like those of Solon, to preserve the
liberty and property of every individual in the community; and to
restrain alike the richest or the poorest, the greatest or the meanest,
from doing or suffering wrong from each other. This is the wise and
salutary plan of power established at the revolution. Would we always
adhere steadily to this plan, and preserve the just æquilibrium, as
delivered down to us by our great ancestors, our constitution would
remain firm and unshaken to the end of time.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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