I pass over as unworthy of serious consideration the detractions and attacks, sometimes thoughtless, and sometimes malicious, to which Mr. Lincoln was subject during his administration. He made explanations and replied to these detractions and attacks only when they seemed to put in peril the fortunes of the country; but when he made replies, there were none found, either among his political friends or his political enemies who were capable of making an adequate answer. Consult, as we may consult, his correspondence in regard to the transit of troops through Maryland, in regard to the invasion of Virginia, in case the city of Washington should be attacked or menaced from the right bank of the Potomac, in regard to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_, in regard to the arrest of Vallandingham, in regard to our foreign relations, and, finally, consult his numerous papers in regard to the objects for which the war should be prosecuted, and the means, as well, by which it could be prosecuted. Consider, also, that this work was done by a man called to the head of an administration that had no predecessor, to the management of the affairs of a government distracted by civil war, its navy scattered, its treasury bankrupted, its foreign relations disturbed by a traditional and almost universal hostility to republican institutions, and all while he was threatened constantly by an adverse public judgment in that section of the country in which his hopes rested exclusively. And consider, also, that Mr. Lincoln had had little or no experience on the statesmanship side of his political career, that as an attorney and advocate he had dealt only with local and municipal laws; that he was separated by circumstances from a practical acquaintance with maritime and international jurisprudence, and yet consider further with what masterful force he rebuked timid or untrustworthy friends who would have abandoned the contest and consented to the independence of the seceding States, in the vain hope that time might aid in the recovery of that which by pusillanimity had been lost; with what serenity of manner he put aside the suggestion of Mr. Seward that war should be declared against France and Spain as a means of quieting domestic difficulties which were even then represented by contending armies; with what calmness of mind he laid aside Mr. Greeley's letter of despair and self-reproach of July 29, 1861, and proceeded with the preparation of his programme of military operations from every base line of the armies of the Republic; with what skill and statesmanlike foresight he corrected Mr. Seward's letter to Mr. Adams in regard to the recognition by Great Britain of the belligerent character of the Confederate States; and, finally, consider with what firmness and wisdom he annulled the proclamations of Fremont and Hunter, and assumed to himself exclusively the right and the power to