"The English Government has never taken an interest in the Danube Principalities nor in the fortunes of your Highness personally, and the attitude of its representatives abroad does not at present appear to inspire confidence. Although I do not positively pre-suppose a hostile feeling in London, it may be accepted as certain that on this question England's policy will not greatly differ from that of the Sultan. "At this moment France, of course, need not be taken into consideration, except so far as there is a possibility of her opposing your Highness by intrigues and secret agitation in the hope of doing Prussia some ill-turn or injury.... "I have for a long time cherished the hope that your Highness would find effectual support in St. Petersburg, and have therefore always recommended cordial relations with Russia. Even now I do not doubt the personal views of his Majesty the Czar, who, I am sure, retains the best and most friendly wishes for your person. But I have been regretfully forced to recognise, especially of late, that this personal good-will is out-weighed by the traditional conception of Russian policy, which is opposed to the union of the Principalities. The fact that your Highness must expect no support from Russia, not even in diplomacy, is in accordance with this traditional policy, whilst the hostile attitude towards your Highness in Vienna appears to me to lack any logical explanation, considered from the standpoint of Austro-Hungarian policy. "It is only natural that your Highness should look to the illustrious Head of your house, to Prussia and Germany. Your Highness is well aware of the views with which his Majesty the King regards your person, but you know also that the present military situation renders it impossible for Germany to intervene effectually in Eastern affairs under the circumstances we have been considering. "On reviewing all these considerations I can only arrive at the conclusion that your Highness cannot expect any outside assistance, but rather ill-will, and that your decisions must be based solely upon the means of support which are still left to you in your own country. If you expect a crisis, for the defeat of which you consider the better elements of the country insufficient, it appears to be a duty to yourself and to your house that your every decision should be really independent and voluntary, and should not seem to be forced upon you by foreign force; and the high and noble motives which guide your Highness should stand prominently forth.