of these two measures, and in none more than this--that the arguments for the Redistribution of Seats has been transferred to this Bill for enlarging the franchise. For, although it is quite true that a Bill for the Redistribution of Seats should aim at making Parliament a mirror of the country, it is also true that there can be nothing more inappropriate than the argument when applied to the enlargement of the franchise. For to pass a Bill which puts the power in a majority of the boroughs into the hands of the working classes is not to make this House a faithful reflection of the opinion of the country, but is to make it an inversion of that opinion by giving political power into the hands of those who have very little social power of any kind. But that principle applies, to a certain extent, to a Redistribution Bill, and from that point I take my departure. Any one who makes an examination as to the nature of the deficiency will see whether this House fails in any considerable degree to reflect the opinion of the country. I confess I have found it exceedingly difficult to discover in what respects it fails to do so. I have, indeed, observed some tendency of a kind which, if we are to have a Redistribution Bill, ought to be corrected. I think there is a visible tendency to too great a uniformity and monotony of representation. I think there is a danger that we may become too much like each other--that we may become merely the multiple of one number. That is a danger which has occurred to thinking men, and I think it very desirable that in a Redistribution Bill we should find a remedy if possible for the tendency to this level of monotony, and perhaps mediocrity. I think another great object we must have in view in a Redistribution Bill should be enfranchisement; and by that I mean not the aggregation of fresh members to large constituencies, and by the enfranchisement of such constituencies the giving more variety and life to the representation of the country, and thus making the House what the country is--a collection of infinite variety of all sorts of pursuits and habits. I think the second advantage is that, by making fresh constituencies by fresh enfranchisements, you do the most efficient thing you can do towards moderating the frightful, enormous, and increasing expense of elections. This is one of the greatest evils of our present system. I am not speaking of the illegitimate expenses of elections, but of the legitimate expenses. We had a paper laid upon our tables this morning giving an account of the expenses of elections from “S” downwards. I take the first few large boroughs, and I will read the expenses. The expense of election for Stafford is £5400; Stoke-upon-Trent, £6200; Sunderland, £5000; and Westminster, £12,000. These are the aggregate expenses of all the candidates. I take them as they come, without picking and choosing. I wish to call particular attention to the case of Westminster, not for the purpose of saying anything