The exercise of the veto in the Senate was simplified by the magistrate, who intended to impede the resolution, signifying his intention beforehand. This is the meaning of the declaration often made by a magistrate in the Senate, e.g. by the consul, that “he would not allow any business to proceed” (_non passurum quicquam agi_).[786] This declaration saved the time of the House, since the veto was not pronounced during the debate, but usually after the voting on the measure[787] or while the voting was in progress.[788] Hence the veto did not interrupt the procedure, nor even the threat of the veto suspend the particular business. The motion on which the veto had been put was, if approved by a majority of the Senate, drawn up as a resolution of the House (_senatus auctoritas_). It had lost its binding legal force as a decree, but it remained as an opinion for the guidance of any magistrate who cared to respect it. Sometimes the Senate requested the magistrate to suspend the intercession (_intercessionem remittere_),[789] and sometimes attached to a particular decree a general vote of censure on any magistrate who should veto it.[790] The intercession on certain kinds of _senatus consulta_ might be forbidden by law. Thus the _lex Sempronia_ (_de provinciis consularibus_) of 123 B.C. forbade the employment of the veto on the senatorial assignment of the consular provinces.[791] It is needless to say that, with this conflict of authority, there was no true theory of responsibility in the Roman magistracy; for that implies a unity of power. But a description of what may be called the second element of responsibility, the capacity for being punished, or for being forced to give compensation, for a misuse of functions, will form a fitting complement to the history of the intercession.