The civil jurisdiction, whether of the urban or provincial praetors, still adhered to the ancient form by which the ruling in law (_in jure_) was the duty of the magistrate, and the judgment on the question of fact (_in judicio_) was the function of a single _judex_ or, in matters requiring rapid decision, of a bench of “recoverers” (_recuperatores_). The rulings of the _praetor urbanus_ had originally followed the forms of the _legis actio_, but in matters affecting _peregrini_ a custom had grown up for the praetor to devise formularies of action (_formulae_) which bound the _judex_ in his decision. The convenience of this procedure extended its use to almost all cases, and by a _lex Aebutia_ of uncertain date the simpler formulary procedure almost wholly replaced the more complicated provisions of the _legis actiones_.[934] The _formula_ was a conditioned acquittal or condemnation; the praetor said to the _judex_, “If it appears that a debt is due, an obligation has been incurred, etc., condemn the defendant in a certain amount or in a sum left to your estimate; if the condition is not apparent, acquit him” (_si paret ... condemna; si non paret, absolve_). The _judex_ by his finding changed the conditioned sentence into one that was categorical and final. In most communities such rulings as those of the praetors would be occasional expositions of a fixed code or of an uncertain body of statute and customary law. At Rome a useful practice was adopted which brought the living law, as opposed to the dead letter of her only code and to statutes which had fallen into disuse, before the eyes of all the people. The praetors announced by means of edicts, issued on their entrance on office, what their rulings would be in any given case. The edict was the “living voice of the civil law”;[935] and it is not surprising to find that by the time of Cicero it had taken the place of the “song” of the Twelve Tables in the legal education of the Roman youth.[936] The profession of the edict was interpretation of the law of Rome; but it was an interpretation that took the form of “assisting, supplementing, and even correcting the civil law.”[937] It was, therefore, not the _jus civile_ of Rome, but the valid modifications of this expressed in what was currently known as magistrates’ law (_jus honorarium_). The civil law was of course presumed as the background of these documents; it found expression in many formulae which the magistrates continued to give, and the _album_ itself probably contained a line of separation which showed where the formulae based on _jus civile_ ended and those founded on magisterial promises began. The most typical language of the _jus honorarium_ is one of command veiled under the form of promises; the praetor asserts “under certain given circumstances I will grant or will not grant a case” (_judicium, actionem dabo ... non dabo_). Less frequently the language is more imperative: “I will compel payment or