The sovereign privilege of exempting individuals from laws was naturally possessed at first by the legislative body itself; but by a curious revolution, which we shall trace elsewhere,[1194] this singular privilege became a prerogative of the Senate. The people’s control of external matters, although it is still, from a juristic point of view, legislative, bears a closer resemblance to the administrative functions of a Greek or modern government. Here the magistrate was empowered to act in all matters of detail, and we shall see how this magisterial sphere was usurped by the Senate. The people had only the control of the fundamental relations of Rome with foreign states. Their activity was confined to the declaration of war, the making of treaties, and the giving of charters. A declaration of war was, according to Roman notions, strictly necessary only when treaty relations, or even at times relations which approximated to those of a treaty,[1195] had been broken. Such a declaration could be made only by the people.[1196] But the international point of view was not the only dominant one in this matter. The people must have been consulted in many cases where there were no treaty relations, and the reason would have been simply the advisability of its declaring its will on a matter which might be of vital importance to the community. The _comitia centuriata_ seems invariably to have represented the people in this capacity.[1197] With respect to the conclusion of international relations, we shall touch elsewhere on the controverted question[1198] whether the magistracy had the right of binding the popular conscience by a sworn treaty, or whether this required the consent of the people. The survival of the controversy into as late a period as that of the Jugurthine war seems to prove that the federative power was once a magisterial privilege; and the fact is also attested by the inclusion in agreements made by commanders of a clause specifying that the agreement should only be valid if ratified by the people.[1199] In the middle Republic there was no question that treaty relations were the prerogative of the people,[1200] and, unlike the case of the declaration of war, the Plebs is here included in the conception of the people.[1201] By the nature of the case it could only be the outlines of an agreement that were thus laid before the _comitia_, and details of settlement were left to the commander, assisted by a commission.[1202] The organisation of a province and the _lex provinciae_ that followed the subjection of a district were not usually interpreted in the light of treaty relations; they were the work of a commander and a senatorial commission. On the other hand, cities with treaties (_civitates foederatae_) and cities with charters (_civitates liberae_) have their rights given them by the people. In the one case the rights are guaranteed by an irrevocable agreement sworn to by the _fetiales_; in the other by a revocable charter