Roman Public LifeGreenidge, A. H. J. (Abel Hendy Jones)
History
Roman Public Life
Greenidge, A. H. J. (Abel Hendy Jones)
Constitutional history -- Rome; Rome -- Politics and government
The Princeps also possessed a power of quashing indictments (_abolitio_),
which does not seem to have been confined to his own jurisdiction, but
to have been extended to other criminal courts as well.[1868] Its origin
may be explained on two grounds. The first depends on the fact that it
was possible to have any case brought to the Emperor’s court, on the
request either of the prosecutor or of the accused. The Emperor might,
after listening to the preliminaries, refuse to hear such a case without
“remitting” it to another court,[1869] and it is very improbable that any
other authority would listen for a moment to a prosecution to which the
Emperor had declined to attend. The dismissal of the case by the Princeps
was practically a power of abolition; but the right might have been
exercised even more directly. Republican history furnishes an instance
of a tribune prohibiting the president of a _quaestio_ from receiving a
charge,[1870] and it is obvious that the _tribunicia potestas_ of the
Princeps might have been exercised in the same way to impede the first
step in the jurisdiction of every criminal court.
With respect to the provinces, just as the criminal appeal finally
passes to the Emperor,[1871] so the revision of the sentences of the
local courts, where revision is suggested by the judge,[1872] as well as
the infliction of punishments denied to the judge—such as the capital
penalty on decurions or deportation on any one[1873]—centre finally in
the hands of the Princeps. All right of revision and restitution is not,
indeed, denied to the provincial governor,[1874] but while this was
finally restricted by certain well-defined rules, the Emperor’s power of
restitution appears ultimately to have been unlimited. “This power might
be so employed by the Emperor as to take the form of a free pardon,[1875]
but theoretically it was merely an equitable assistance. As a legally
unlimited power of rescinding sentences, it approaches very nearly to
a power of pardon; but it is an executive duty rather than a sovereign
right, and we search in vain in the Principate for a power of pardon
regarded as an admitted constitutional right of a sovereign.”[1876]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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