[Sidenote: Has God or man free will?] =232.= The supreme problems of philosophy, in their relation to gods and men, the fellow-citizens of this universe, centre in the question of free will. If we grant that the divine power is to some extent less in range than the power of necessity, does it still remain open to us to attribute to it within that range some real choice between alternatives, something of that individual power which common opinion attributes to kings? or must we on the other hand regard the divinity as a mere symbol of an unchanging law, girt with the trappings of a royalty from which all real share in government has been withdrawn? Is man again a mere puppet under the control either of fate or of fortune, or has he too some share in creating the destiny to which he must submit? Supposing him to have this power of will, is it bound up with his privilege of reason, or do the animals also possess it? [Sidenote: The Stoics incline towards free will.] =233.= To such questions the Stoics do not give the direct answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ The critics who wish to tie them down to one or other of the opposing views complain that they wriggle and grow flushed and excited about their answer[77]. They accept apparently both views as dogmas, asserting that ‘all things take place by destiny’ and that ‘something rests with us[78].’ To the first dogma the whole of their treatment of physics points; but the second is required as a postulate for any science of ethics[78a]. The Stoics were in no way disposed to cut the knot by sacrificing one or the other of the principal parts of their philosophy. They go back upon the terms in which the questions are propounded, and endeavour by fresh investigation and more precise definition to do away with the obvious contradiction. In this work they were observed to have a bias in favour of free will[79]. The first sign of this bias we have already noticed in the vindication of the word ‘possible[80].’ If our eyes are fixed merely on the movement of the heavenly bodies, we shall hardly need a term which prints on future events a character which it denies to those that are past. The astronomer can describe to us with equal precision an eclipse taking place a thousand years before the battle of Salamis or a thousand years after. But the word ‘possible’ opens the door to the emotions of hope and fear, to the sense of right and wrong, with regard to the whole range of future events. However delicately the doctrine may be shaded, the main issue is determined when we say of gods and men that they ‘can[81].’ [Sidenote: Proximate and principal causes.]