=317.= Virtue is a state of the mind, a disposition of the soul; it is not an act. Hence the bent of the mind (_inclinatio_), its aim (_intentio_), its desire (βούλησις, _voluntas_) is everything; the performance through the organs of the body is nothing[102]. This Stoic dogma is to-day so familiar in divinity, law, and society that it is not easy to realize how paradoxical it seemed when first stated. By its proclamation the Stoics defied the whole system of _tabu_ by which the ancient world prohibited certain acts as in themselves dangerous and detestable; a system still in force in many departments of life and theoretically defended by the ‘intuitive system of morals.’ The defenders of _tabu_ were bitterly affronted, and indignantly asked questions which mostly concerned the sexual relations, with regard to which _tabu_ appears to have been at the time most vigorous. ‘Is there nothing wrong in cannibalism? in foul language? in incest? in the accursed relations with boy favourites (παιδικά)?’ To these questions firm-minded Stoics were bound to give a negative answer, thereby laying themselves open to the charge of being defenders of immorality. This charge however is never to be taken seriously; the high practical morality of the Stoics placed them beyond reproach. But it was also easy to raise a laugh by quotations from these austere moralists which sounded like a defence of licentiousness. The solution of the difficulty in each individual case follows exactly the same lines as in politics; and there is the same divergence of method between the early Stoics, who assert their principles at all costs, and those of the transition period, who are intent upon adapting them to the existing conditions of society. Here we need only discuss the questions of principle, as we deal with questions affecting practical life in another chapter[103]. [Sidenote: Tabus.]