Roman Stoicism: being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman EmpireArnold, Edward Vernon
Religion
Roman Stoicism: being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire
Arnold, Edward Vernon
Stoics
The breach with the state-religion which was latent in Socrates was
displayed without disguise by the Cynics. Antisthenes, following in the
track of the ardent Xenophanes, declared that the popular gods were many,
but the god of nature was one[81]; he denounced the use of images[82];
and he and his followers naturally acquired the reproach of atheism[83].
Equally offensive to the Athenians was their cosmopolitanism[84], which
treated the pride of Hellenic birth as vain, and poured contempt on the
glorious victories of Marathon and Salamis. Nor did the Cynics consider
the civilization of their times as merely indifferent; they treated it
as the source of all social evils, and looked for a remedy in the return
to a ‘natural’ life, to the supposed simplicity and virtue of the savage
unspoilt by education. Thus they formulated a doctrine which especially
appealed to those who felt themselves simple and oppressed, and which has
been well described as ‘the philosophy of the proletariate of the Greek
world[85].’
[Sidenote: Cynic intuitionism.]
=52.= The destructive criticism of the Cynics did not stop with its
attack upon Greek institutions; it assailed the citadel of reason itself.
Socrates had renounced physics; the Cynics considered that dialectic was
equally unnecessary[86]. For the doctrine of general concepts and the
exercise of classification they saw no use; they were strict Nominalists;
horses they could see, but not ‘horsiness.’ In their ethics they held
to the chief doctrines of Socrates, that ‘virtue is knowledge,’ ‘virtue
can be taught’ and ‘no one willingly sins’; and they laid special
stress on the ‘sufficiency’ (αὐτάρκεια) of virtue, which to produce
happiness needs (according to them) nothing in addition to itself except
a Socratic strength of character (Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς)[87]. But in reality
they identified virtue with this will-power, and entirely dispensed with
knowledge; virtue was to them a matter of instinct, not of scientific
investigation. They appear therefore as the real founders of that ethical
school which bases knowledge of the good on intuition, and which is at
the present time, under ever-varying titles, the most influential of all.
In practice, the virtue which specially appealed to the Cynics was that
of ‘liberty,’ the claim of each man at every moment to do and say that
which seems to him right, without regard to the will of sovereigns, the
conventions of society, or the feelings of his neighbour; the claim made
at all times by the governed against their rulers, whether these are just
or unjust, reckless or farseeing.
[Sidenote: Limits of Cynism.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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