=108.= It is an interesting question, which perhaps needs further investigation, to what extent this approximation between the doctrines of the Academy and the Porch can be traced in the writings of Chrysippus. On the one hand we must remember that Chrysippus was a man of distinctly orthodox temperament; he firmly opposed the Cynizing heresies of Aristo, and strongly defended the Stoic theory of knowledge against the Academy. But our knowledge of the teaching of Chrysippus, abundant in volume, is lacking in precision. Our authorities, as we have seen, very imperfectly distinguish, and very inadequately record, the teaching of the two earlier masters; and the doctrines which are regarded as common to all Stoics must be assumed to be generally stated in the language of Chrysippus, whose works remained for centuries the recognised standard of orthodoxy. Even so there are few distinctive doctrines of Chrysippus which do not seem to be foreshadowed in expressions attributed to some earlier teacher. Yet we may fairly assume that in his ethical teaching there was a substantial sacrifice of the forcefulness of the Socratic character, and a corresponding approach to Academic views. This appears when he defines the supreme good as ‘a life according to nature, that is, both general nature and our individual human nature[106],’ and adds, ‘for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the all[107].’ This approaches the doctrine of ‘virtue appropriate to the individual’ (οἰκεία ἀρετή), as taught by the Academics[108]. A still more striking concession is his permission to men engaged in practical life to describe advantages as ‘good things,’ provided they are carefully distinguished from the supreme good[109]. [Sidenote: Successors of Chrysippus.]