It would be possible to frame in the name of insight an indictment against science that would make the indictment Rousseau has framed against it in the name of instinct seem mild. The critical humanist, however, will leave it to others to frame such an indictment. Nothing is more foreign to his nature than every form of obscurantism. He is ready indeed to point out that the man of science has in common with him at least one important idea--the idea of habit, though its scientific form seems to him very incomplete. One may illustrate from perhaps the best known recent treatment of the subject, that of James in his “Psychology.” It is equally significant that the humanist can agree with nearly every line of James’s chapter on habit and that he disagrees very gravely with James in his total tendency. That is because James shows himself, as soon as he passes from the naturalistic to the humanistic level, wildly romantic. Even when dealing with the “Varieties of Religious Experience” he is plainly more preoccupied with the intensity than with the centrality of this experience.[312] He is obsessed with the idea that comes down to him straight from the age of original genius that to be at the centre is to be commonplace. In a letter to C. E. Norton (June 30, 1904) James praises Ruskin’s Letters and adds: “Mere sanity is the most philistine and at bottom unessential of a man’s attributes.” “Mere sanity” is not to be thus dismissed, because to lack sanity is to be headed towards misery and even madness. “Ruskin’s,” says Norton, who was in a position to know, “was essentially one of the saddest of lives.”[313] Is a man to live one of the saddest of lives merely to gratify romantic lovers of the vivid and picturesque like James?