[184] As if sin really came by the law in this sense; as if a law defining and prohibiting a malpractice were the cause of the commission of the act which it constituted a malpractice. As if giving a name and juristic classification to any kind of conduct were adding to men's motives for indulging in it. [185] P. 269. [186] P. 278. [187] Pp. 285-287. [188] P. 273. [189] P. 250. [190] _Politicus_, 268 D-274 E. [191] Here for instance is D'Alembert's story:--"The necessity of shielding our own body from pain and destruction leads us to examine among external objects those which are useful and those which are hurtful, so that we may seek the one and flee the others. But we hardly begin our search into such objects before we discover among them a great number of beings which strike us as exactly like ourselves; that is, whose form is just like our own, and who, so far as we can judge at the first glance, appear to have the same perceptions. Everything therefore leads us to suppose that they have also the same wants, and consequently the same interest in satisfying them, whence it results that we must find great advantage in joining with them for the purpose of distinguishing in nature what has the power of preserving us from what has the power of hurting us. The communication of ideas is the principle and the stay of this union, and necessarily demands the invention of signs; such is the origin of the formation of societies." _Discours Préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie._ Contrast this with Aristotle's sensible statement (_Polit._ I. ii. 15) that "there is in men by nature a strong impulse to enter into such union." [192] _Code de la Nature._ [193] See, for example, his criticism on the Abbé de St. Pierre. _Conf._, viii. 264. And also in the analysis of this very Discourse, above, vol. i. p. 163.