Objection has been taken to the fact that he starts upon his task with a definite bias in a certain direction. He candidly admits from the outset that his aim is to find a meaning for life, and in doing this he of course tacitly assumes that life has a deep and profound meaning. Strict scientists aver that the investigator must set out without prejudice, to examine the phenomena he observes; and Eucken's initial bias may form a fatal stumbling-block to the acceptance of his philosophy by these, or indeed, by any who are not disposed to accept this fundamental position. If we deny that life has a meaning, then Eucken has little for us; but if we are merely doubtful on the matter, the reading of Eucken will probably bring conviction. Many critics point to the far-reaching assumptions he makes. He assumes as axiomatic certainties and insoluble mysteries the existence of the spiritual life in man, the union of the human and divine, and the freedom of the spiritual personalities, though in a sense dependent upon the Universal Spiritual Life. This of course does not mean that he is in the habit of making unjustifiable assumptions. This is far from being the case; on the contrary, he takes the greatest care in the matter of his speculative bases. There are some fundamental facts of life, however, which according to Eucken are proved to us by life itself; we feel they must be true, but they are not truths that can be reasoned about, nor proved by the intellect alone. These are the three great facts mentioned above, which, while not admitting of proof, must be regarded as certainties. His contention that they cannot be reasoned about has led to the further charge of irrationalism. The question that has to be decided is, whether Eucken in emphasising the fact that great truths must be solved by life and action, is underestimating the part that intellect must play in life. The decision must be largely one of individual opinion. Many critics are of the opinion that he does lay too little stress upon the intellectual factor in life. In actual fact, however, the fault is more apparent than real, for Eucken does in fact reason and argue closely concerning the facts of life. The charge, too, is to some extent due to the fact that he continually attacks the over-emphasis on the intellectual that the people of his own race--the Germans--are apt to place. With the glorification of the intellect he has no sympathy, for he feels there is something higher and more valuable in life than thought--and that is action. These are the main points of criticism that have been raised--the reader must judge for himself how seriously they should be regarded. But before arriving at a final opinion he must think again of the contributions Eucken has indubitably made to philosophy and religion, of which we shall again in brief remind him.