Although it is extremely improbable that the world will ever again witness a war carried on under conditions similar to those obtaining in the contest carried on between the North and South in the sixties, still it is possible, as recent events have shown, that the United States might find themselves involved in a struggle with a first-rate maritime Power. If this were the case, the first step to be taken by that Power would be to blockade the United States ports. This being so, it is interesting to consider how, owing to increased speed, quick-firing guns, and search-lights, the relationships between blockaders and blockade-runners have been affected during the last thirty years. In the civil war the conditions were very different from those likely to occur in the future; the blockade-runners of those days were unarmed, and their business was to dodge, not to fight, the blockaders, and the shortness of the run before a safe port could be reached made possible a heavy outlay for building and maintaining special vessels. But to my mind the most salient alteration in the conditions affecting the question is the introduction of quick-firing guns, search-lights, and increased speed. Before considering the effect of these changes on the future of blockading, it will be as well to ascertain what lessons were learnt from the blockade of the American coast. We soon discovered that with due care and pluck the risk was far less than people believed; except in a few cases our losses were caused by ignorance of position in making the port. In some cases this was owing to the fact of our being chased about by day; in others it was caused by the irregular action of the Gulf-stream; and in some cases it was due to neglect and want of care in keeping a proper look-out at daylight; also to not keeping clear of vessels when seen, and to steaming too fast when not necessary, thereby causing smoke, which discovered to the blockaders the position of the runner. Discovery (after taking all possible precautions) by a faster vessel was the cause of a small minority of captures. Again, the blockade was carried on on a wrong principle. The Northern plan was,—to keep a number of ships close off the port, as a rule anchoring by day and by night moving close in, and a few ships at a moderate distance from the land. This plan enabled runners to lie out a fair distance from the shore at sunset so as to run in when the time came, having the whole night before them should they be seen. On coming out, we felt that after the first ten miles or so from the shore there was little chance of anything seeing us before daylight, and if we were seen then the inshore squadron could not join in the chase.