In proof of all these statements, the experience of the world in widely varying regions is appealed to. The natural breaking down of prohibitory tariffs has given opportunity for observation. Especially has the commerce between states of the Union, where it is absolutely free, shown the general advantage of such freedom in rapid development of wealth and welfare. While these states have a common interest in government, they are nevertheless widely distinguished in peculiarities of local government and in characteristics of people. While, therefore, there is possible doubt as to the wisdom of rapid removal of restrictions, there is every probability that such restrictions will gradually be outgrown. Even the temptation to make retaliatory duties, where other governments restrict against our products, is growing less with increasing experience of the true advantage in exchanges. The world is gradually coming to see that the better market any region of country affords for the rest of the world, the better market the rest of the world affords for it. _Incidental tendencies from tariff._—The incidental effects of restrictive tariffs, and especially of the necessary instability of restrictive legislation, are too interesting to pass by, though very limited space can be afforded them. In the first place they contribute to a speculative enterprise which leads to waste of wealth in unpromising undertakings because of a necessary over-estimate of the advantage given. On the other hand, a reduction of the same tariff after a series of years is almost sure to bring panic in that line of industry previously fostered. So the fluctuations of tariff laws are one element in periodic expansion and contraction of business. The tariff laws are certain, also, to involve the worst element of influence through the lobby upon legislative bodies. Even though the charge of bribery be utterly false, the general respect for legislative bodies is lowered by charges and countercharges for political effect. As an occasion for such charges scarce any other form of legislation serves as well. Even the people themselves are easily assumed by their neighbors to weigh their opinions upon a tariff measure by their personal interests.