_Federations of labor._—The so-called federations of labor, in which practically the only bond of union between individuals is the fact that all are wage-earners, have so far worked out but a small part of the problem involved in their existence. They have the advantage of uniting large numbers and a variety of interests; but they have the disadvantage of subordinating all other interests to the supposed conflict between employers and employed. Their tendency is almost certain toward lowering standards of efficiency, and attempting by class legislation to get the advantage of mere numbers. It is almost impossible that the organization shall be kept out of the field of bargains in politics and contrivance for special legislation, demoralizing to the whole country. Too often the votes of members are made a bribe for securing certain favors. In the nature of the case, they sustain a body of officers whose chief business is in danger of becoming that of either political agitators or political bosses. The machinery of organization is liable to reduce the independence of individuals. The organization itself is liable to demand a personal subordination almost equivalent to military rule, and the badge of the society may mark a man as under direction of authority. Even in questions where the majority rule, the force of the federation requires the caucus principle of absolute adherence, even though the majority represents the weakest and least intelligent part of the organization. The demoralizing effect of such methods, including wholesale trading of opinions, is liable to debase citizenship, and so to diminish the individual self-respect, which is the highest possible protection for laborers. _Courts of arbitration._—Arbitration between employers and employed, in cases of serious misunderstanding, has long been advocated as a wise means of settling differences. The obstacles to its general, voluntary adoption are considerable. Employers object because it involves the admission of an outsider as a judge of their business methods. The employés object because they fear the sympathy of arbitrators with the superior intelligence, wealth and power of employers. Yet there seems no good reason why a representative body of men, chosen for character and ability, should not be appealed to by both parties in a contest which has already broken up the natural relations of business. As has been shown, the whole community suffers in every interruption of production and trade, and so far the community has the right, and should have the legal privilege, of insisting upon the fairest and quickest means of settling the controversy. In far less important difficulties between individuals, society insists that either individual shall have the right to bring the other into court.