Also in the previous lecture I construed _perception_ (as used by Bacon) as meaning _taking account_ of the essential character of the thing perceived, and I construed _sense_ as meaning _cognition_. We certainly do take account of things of which at the time we have no explicit cognition. We can even have a cognitive memory of the taking account, without having had a contemporaneous cognition. Also, as Bacon points out by his statement, “... for else all bodies would be alike one to another,” it is evidently some element of the essential character which we take account of, namely something on which diversity is founded and not mere bare logical diversity. The word ‘_perceive_’ is, in our common usage, shot through and through with the notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word ‘_apprehension_’, even with the adjective _cognitive_ omitted. I will use the word ‘_prehension_’ for _uncognitive apprehension_: by this I mean _apprehension_ which may or or may not be cognitive. Now take Euphranor’s last remark: “Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the planet, nor the cloud, _which you see here_, are those real ones which you suppose exist at distance?” Accordingly, there is a prehension, _here_ in this place, of things which have a reference to _other_ places. Now go back to Berkeley’s sentences, quoted from his _Principles of Human Knowledge_. He contends that what constitutes the realisation of natural entities is the being perceived within the unity of mind.