Now this would obviously be effected if we suppose the same thing to go on in the second poker as took place between the first poker and the second. Let the twist in the handle end C of the second poker be accompanied by the production of an image twist in the black end D. And let us take this as a fair account of our observations. If a body, which as a whole does not undergo a twist, has one part of it twisted, then there will be the image twist in the other part of it. I say that the poker as a whole is not twisted, and all that this means is that if it be removed from the electrical influence it is found to be not charged; and the idea which we may form is this: the strings of particles are twisted like the two strips of paper round the pencil; they are twisted so that they will exactly unwind if left alone. Now of course all these suppositions are merely provisional, and must be dismissed unless seen to be mechanically possible; but for the present we are trying to see if our assumption will fit in with facts. And our assumption is that there is in nature a power which amongst the molecules produces that as a real thing which in our larger mode of existence only occurs as a simulacrum and appearance. Our looking-glass images are not real, but we suppose that real images are produced amongst the molecules.[3] We have seen that if we make a certain supposition as to the calling up of an image twist by a twist of molecular matter, then the main facts of electricity are capable of an explanation, which, involving merely the motion of ordinary matter, is far preferable to the idea of there being a mysterious fluid, and more in harmony with our present ideas of electricity. And yet it is impossible to retain this supposition unless a clear mechanical explanation can be given of how a real image of itself can be called up by the twist which we suppose electricity to be. We can by intelligent agency produce a twist which is the real image of a given twist. But it would be absurd to suppose amongst the molecules an agency which, acting with prescribed aim, gave in that domain those real simulacra, those evident images, those phantoms with which we in our larger world of masses are for ever mocked. And yet it would be curious if such an hypothesis were to claim a recognized position in our mental apparatus with which we think about nature. For in that molecular world, if we imagine it to ourselves, there would be a curious state.