Great Britain. Royal Navy -- History; Naval art and science; Sea-power
Let no one dismiss the foregoing retrospect as merely ancient
history. On the contrary, let all those who desire to see the
British Empire follow the path of its natural development in
tranquillity study the recent past. By doing this we shall be
able to estimate aright the position of the fleet in the defence
of the empire. We must examine the circumstances in which we
are placed. For five-and-thirty years the nations of the world
have practically lived under the rule of force. The incessant
object of every great state has been to increase the strength
of its armed forces up to the point at which the cost becomes
intolerable. Countries separated from one another only by arbitrary
geographical lines add regiment to regiment and gun to gun, and
also devise continually fresh expedients for accelerating the
work of preparing their armies to take the field. The most
pacifically inclined nation must do in this respect as its neighbours
do, on pain of losing its independence and being mutilated in
its territory if it does not. This rivalry has spread to the
sea, and fleets are increased at a rate and at a cost in money
unknown to former times, even to those of war. The possession of
a powerful navy by some state which has no reason to apprehend
over-sea invasion and which has no maritime interests, however
intrinsically important they may be, commensurate with the strength
of its fleets, may not indicate a spirit of aggression; but it
at least indicates ability to become an aggressor. Consequently,
for the British fleet to fill its proper position in the defence
of the empire it must be strong. To be strong more than large
numbers will be required. It must have the right, that is the
best, material, the best organisation, the best discipline, the
best training, the best distribution. We shall ascertain the
position that it should hold, if we examine what it would have
to do when called upon for work more active than that of peace
time. With the exception of India and Canada no part of the empire
is liable to serious attack that does not come over-sea. Any
support that can be given to India or Canada by other parts of
the empire must be conveyed across the sea also. This at once
indicates the importance of ocean lines of communication.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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