In the ling fishing the fisherman may be regarded, if we speak technically, as a vendor to the merchant. Practically he is a partner, for the price of his wet fish is in proportion to the proceeds of the merchant's sales of the cured fish. In the Faroe fishing the fisherman is more distinctly and formally a partner, for the agreement signed by the merchant and the crew entitles him to a share of one-half of the net proceeds of the fishing. The question to be answered is, whether the principle of the Truck Acts extends to these two occupations, so as to justify the State in laying down such rules as shall prevent the fisherman in either case from taking part of his earnings, although they are not wages, otherwise than in current coin; and if that be so, what practical difficulties stand in the way of applying the principle. It is difficult to read the evidence without arriving at the conclusion, that if it is right to protect the skilled artisans of Sheffield and Birmingham, and the highly paid miners of Lanarkshire and South Wales, from receiving their wages in goods, it is also right to require the fish-curer of Shetland to give money instead of goods to his fishermen. By whatever name we may call the earnings of the latter, there is not such a difference in the positions of the two classes as to justify us in applying to them different rules of law. Both are labouring men; for the Shetlander's possession of a small allotment of third-rate land does not elevate above the condition of a peasant. If we apply to the Shetlander the legal distinctions which occur in the existing law, he differs but little from some of the protected crafts in England. He engages to fish the curer, and to give him the produce of his labour at the current price, just as a collier contracts to put out coal at a certain rate per ton. If the law is to protect from truck the man who agrees to be paid not directly for his labour, but for the result of his labour, the Shetland ling fisher may be held to fall within that principle. There is, indeed, this distinction, that his remuneration depends on the price eventually obtained for the produce of his labour, so that he takes the risk of the market. The amount of his earnings is affected both by his success in catching fish and by the fluctuations of the market. The collier, on the other hand, works for wages fixed at a certain rate, and the only element of uncertainty is the quantity of his out-put. The fisherman certainly works upon the co-operative principle at present; and in considering any legislative change, it may be desirable to avoid interfering with this principle of the present system, and unintentionally leading to the substitution of fixed wages. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE TO ENFORCE SHORT PAYMENTS