Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Philosophy
Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?
Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Diplomacy; Europe -- Politics and government
In England, the mother of Parliaments, we might expect that there
should have been a constant effort at parliamentary control of
foreign affairs, with strong remonstrance when effective control was
denied; yet on account of the specific nature of the system of Cabinet
government, such has not been the case. Under the two-party system as
it exists in England the conduct of foreign affairs is always in the
hands of a minister trusted and supported by the majority in the Lower
House. Even if the minority should attempt to censor the conduct of
foreign affairs as being carried on apart from the knowledge and active
consent of the House, the majority whose leaders form the Cabinet which
is managing things, will always prevent such a vote from succeeding.
Only in case of a cabinet going absolutely and openly counter to the
policy of its own party in Parliament could a real conflict of this
nature arise; and such a contingency is itself impossible, because of
the party control exercised by the cabinet.
According to the theory of the Stuarts, the management of foreign
affairs belonged entirely to the Crown which had not at that time been
put in commission. In 1677 the House of Commons objected to granting
money for alliances and for wars, unless the matter in question had
been previously communicated to it. Charles II, however, declared the
conduct of foreign affairs to be the Crown’s fundamental prerogative
in which it must remain free from direct control of Parliament.
William III was in fact to a very large extent his own Minister for
Foreign Affairs. With the introduction of responsible Government
under the Hanoverians, however, the situation changed. The dominant
party being represented by the ministers was quite ready to submit to
their guidance in matters of foreign affairs. It was the opposition
who occasionally attacked the government on its foreign policy, and
particularly the opposition in the House of Lords. In a Lords’ protest
of March 26, 1734, it was urged that “the interposition of the British
Parliament would be more effectual than the occasional expedients of
fluctuating and variable negotiations.” In 1740 it was moved that a
select committee consisting of peers should be appointed to inquire
into the conduct of the Spanish War. The motion was rejected. Another
Lords’ protest in the same year opposes the argument that absolute
secrecy is essential because this claim is often used in bar of all
inquiries. Such secrecy is “much oftener the refuge of guilt than the
resort of innocence.”
Wyndham, in 1733, on a motion calling for certain letters of
instructions, argued for the necessity of giving such information to
Parliament. He asked how could members of the House of Commons judge
of the estimates to be laid before them as a provision for national
safety if they did not know by what danger the nation was confronted.
The motion, however, was rejected.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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